Every few years, a debate arises within the political precincts of the pro-life movement about the merits of a dramatic shift in approach. Since so much visceral disgust remains, on the part of the public, for late-term abortions, why not seek an outright ban on this barbaric practice at some point in pregnancy? Advocates of this so called “gestational approach” argue that an initial ban would be the thin end of a long wedge that would eventually result in a total prohibition on pre-natal infanticide. Moreover, their pragmatic approach would, in the meantime, save the lives of some babies that would otherwise be liquidated in the absence of such a law.
Perhaps the strongest evidence that could be marshaled in favour of this approach is the success of the movements opposed to traditional family values, and advocates of euthanasia. The stunning shift in public acceptance of arrangements, such as gay “marriage,” which would have been unthinkable even a few decades ago, proves that radical ends can be achieved by slow and steady progress. Likewise, the parabolic growth in the practice of euthanasia, or MAiD—which is a grave scandal to the wider world—demonstrates all-too-vividly the power of “trojan horse” legislation: bills passed only because of the seemingly robust protections they included are denuded of those so-called safeguards almost immediately. Why shouldn’t the pro-life movement take a page from the playbook of our opponents, especially given their undeniable record of recent success?
The first thing to say in response is that the pro-life movement in Canada has never been opposed to incrementalism. A ban on partial-birth abortions, laws mandating informed consent, parental consent, and waiting periods, in addition to defunding abortion at the federal and provincial levels—all of these are reasonable, salutary, and productive legislative angles to pursue. But any gestational legislation differs from these in kind, because even as it proscribes abortion past a certain arbitrary point, it also enshrines it as well. It is for this reason that the vast majority of the pro-life movement in Canada has always rejected, at the level of principle, legislation of this kind.
Nor has this principled opposition to gestational limits been counterproductive, as the example of numerous other countries makes clear. Indeed, statistics from France, Germany, Spain, Poland, and the United Kingdom show that the passage of gestational laws reliably leads to an increased number of abortions. The concomitant absence, in these same countries, of any meaningful enforcement of these laws showcases the problems of this paradigm: not only does the practice of abortion enjoy the imprimatur of law, this very recognition makes its nominal restriction unenforceable.
Medical Assistance in Dying offers a vivid analogue of this twofold problem in action. When the laws allowing euthanasia and assisted suicide were passed, the bevy of restrictions which came along with them were actually already rendered moot in principle. This is the reason why the populations menaced by euthanasia are ever expanding. Any law offering putative protection to the unborn would, in practice, be unable to limit in some cases what it allows in others, and ultimately serve only to salve the consciences of members of the public who would otherwise be scandalized by an absence of law.
A gestational legal regime would not actually impose any limits on the number, or the forms, of prenatal infanticide for the same reason that medical murder is now running rampant throughout our medical system. Here, again, MAiD demonstrates why any gestational law would be completely feckless. Consider how many “limit cases” by which the families, loved ones, or even the caregivers of the euthanized have been so outraged that they have contacted the authorities. How many crown prosecutors have brought these cases to trial? How many of the conspicuously prolific death doctors have been the subject of meaningful investigations? Against what kind of headwinds would any investigations or litigations take place? And what kind of jury pool would be free from the prejudice of a media that would frame any case as a de facto referendum which would unfairly put mere citizens in the place of policy-makers?
The answers to such questions are as obvious as the parallels one could envisage with a gestational law. As many abortionists would be prosecuted by these laws as death-dealing MAiD doctors have already been: that is, none. What is necessary to protect the elderly, the mentally ill, the infirm, and the vulnerable is the same as what is necessary to protect the unborn: a complete ban which makes any violation of the targeted group’s right to life an infringement which can be meaningfully prosecuted as the obscene act of murder which it is. Enshrining a compromise in law only makes such protection all but impossible.
This is also the reason why the pro-life movement has had such distain for politicians who style themselves “pro-life with exceptions.” It is no more sagacious or moderate to accede to abortion in exceptional cases than it would be to admit exceptions for slavery, as if some kind of fraught or scandalizing context could in some way justify the ownership of another human being. When the protection of life is at stake, firm principle is the only bulwark. And it is from the fountainhead of principle that the defense of life becomes cogent, coherent, and compelling. Concessions and compromises, on the other hand, render the protection of the vulnerable incoherent in principle and impossible in practice. When the possibility of permissible violations has been allowed, law and practice both devolve further towards increasing encroachments of the right to life.
The perfect remains the enemy of the good. But there is no good to be achieved with a gestational approach; its apparent pragmatism would only saddle the pro-life movement with the Pyrrhic victory of an unenforceable law at the cost of espousing a self-contradictory position. Far better, then, to be nourished by the inexhaustible wellspring of the truth of the unborn child’s humanity and dignity while also taking whatever prudent and incremental legislative steps are consistent with this truth. Any defense of the unborn that forsakes this principle will leave them weaker—and will deprive our movement of its most valuable and effective asset: the truth.
